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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between quality of government and regional
resilience in the European Union during the Great Recession. The results show
that the quality of government is an important factor when shaping the regional
reaction to the crisis. Our estimates reveal that higher quality of government is
associated with greater regional resilience over the Great Recession. This is partly
due to the role played in this context by spatial spillovers induced by the quality of
government in neighbouring regions. The observed link between governance and
regional resilience is robust to the inclusion in the analysis of different explana-
tory variables that may affect both government quality and regional resilience.
Likewise, our findings do not depend on the specific dimension of governance
considered, the estimation method or the econometric specification employed to
capture the nature of spatial spillovers.
Keywords: quality of government, regional resilience, European Union,
Great Recession.
JEL classification: H11, R12.
1 Introduction
The Great Recession that started in 2008 has affected Europe more severely than any
other crisis since the end of the Second World War (Capello and Caragliu, 2016). Al-
though the roots of this major economic downturn have to do with the collapse of the
United States housing bubble and the excessive expansion of credit, its consequences
immediately spread across the whole of Europe. By mid-2009, GDP per capita in the
European Union (EU) had already decreased by 5% compared with the fourth quarter of
2007, whereas unemployment increased from 7 to 11% between 2007 and 2013 (Fratesi
and Rodŕıguez-Pose, 2016). Nevertheless, the impact of the crisis has been highly uneven
across Europe, both between countries as well as between regions within countries (e.g.
Groot et al., 2011; Capello et al., 2015; Christopherson et al., 2015). Taking into ac-
count the long-lasting economic and social effects of the Great Recession, it is especially
important to examine what might account for this geographical variation. To address
this issue, one should investigate the factors behind regional economic resilience, which
can be defined as “the capacity of a regional or local economy to withstand or recover
from market, competitive and environmental shocks to its developmental growth path,
if necessary by undergoing adaptive changes to its economic structures and its social
and institutional arrangements, so as to maintain or restore its previous developmental
path, or transit to a new sustainable path characterized by a fuller and more productive
use of its physical, human and environmental resources” (Martin and Sunley, 2015, p.
13).
The literature on regional economic resilience has considerably grown in recent
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years.1 From an empirical perspective, this literature has highlighted the relevance
of different factors in shaping regional reactions to external shocks, including the sec-
toral composition of economic activity and its degree of diversity, the endowment of
human capital, the intensity of innovation activities, labour market characteristics, ur-
banization patterns, or national macroeconomic conditions (e.g. Davies, 20011; Martin,
2012; Brakman et al., 2015; Crescenzi et al., 2016a; Giannakis and Bruggeman, 2017).
However, as far as we are aware, the potential influence of the quality of government on
regional resilience has received no attention in this literature.2 This omission is espe-
cially disconcerting, given that, as we will see below, there are several reasons to assume
that the way in which governments comply with their obligations and administer public
services should affect the ability of regions to withstand recessionary shocks. In order
to fill this gap, the present paper aims to examine the relationship between quality of
government and regional resilience in the EU during the Great Recession, using data
on 255 NUTS2 regions from 27 different countries.3 In particular, we are interested in
finding out to what extent governance outcomes can contribute to mitigating the impact
of the Great Recession at the regional level.
A second main contribution of the paper has to do with the methodological approach
adopted to investigate the link between quality of government and regional resilience.
Unlike previous studies on the determinants of regional resilience in the European con-
1For recent surveys, see the 2016 special issue of Regional Studies on “Resilience revisited”, or the
2018 special issue of The Annals of Regional Science on “Regional determinants of economic resilience”.
2Nevertheless, there is abundant evidence of the importance of the quality of government for eco-
nomic development. Most of these studies have generally focused on countries in the world (e.g. Hall
and Jones, 1999; Kaufmann and Kraay, 2002; Rodrik et al., 2004), although there are also analyses at
the regional level (e.g. Rodŕıguez-Pose and Garcilazo, 2015; Ketterer and Rodŕıguez-Pose, 2018).
3NUTS is the French acronym for “Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics”, a hierarchical
classification of subnational spatial units established by Eurostat according to administrative criteria. In
this classification, NUTS0 corresponds to the country level, while increasing numbers indicate increasing
levels of territorial disaggregation.
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text, in our paper the sample regions are not treated as isolated units that evolve in-
dependently of the rest, and spatial effects are formally incorporated into the analysis.
This approach allows us to explore the role played by spatial spillovers in explaining
the effect of the quality of government on regional resilience in the EU, and to consider
the potential existence of spatially correlated shocks that may affect regional economic
performance over the study period. Thus, our analysis explicitly takes into account the
possibility that the impact of the Great Recession in any given region is influenced by
the conditions in neighbouring regions.
The results of the paper show that the quality of government is an important factor
when shaping the regional reaction to the crisis in the EU. Our estimates reveal that
higher quality of government is associated with greater regional resilience over the Great
Recession. This is partly due to the role played in this context by spatial spillovers in-
duced by the quality of government in neighbouring regions. The observed link between
governance and regional resilience is robust to the inclusion in the analysis of different
explanatory variables that may affect both government quality and regional resilience.
Likewise, our findings do not depend on the specific dimension of governance considered,
the estimation method or the econometric specification employed to capture the nature
of spatial spillovers.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. After this introduction, section
2 discusses from a theoretical point of view why the quality of government should affect
regional resilience. Section 3 describes the measures of governance and regional resilience
used in the paper. In turn, section 4 presents the results of the empirical analysis carried
out to investigate the connection between quality of government and regional resilience.
The final section offers the main conclusions from the paper.
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2 Why should the quality of government affect re-
gional resilience?
There are various reasons to assume that the quality of government is related to regional
resilience. To begin with, government performance may affect the type, frequency and
intensity of the shocks experienced by regional economies. This is particularly evident
in the case of financial shocks, such as the one in the origin of the Great Recession. As
a result of financial shocks, leveraged firms find themselves in a position in which their
liquidity is called back by the lender, which in turn has a direct effect on firms ability to
run and manage existing jobs (Boeri et al., 2012). Consequently, firms may be forced to
cut their investments, shut down part of their business activity and destroy jobs. The
quality of government can play a crucial role in this context, minimizing the vulnerability
of the economy to adverse financial shocks, given that well-regulated capital markets
are likely to experience less intense crises (OECD, 2017). Corruption, which is a central
element of the quality of government, can also undermine financial stability. In a setting
with a high level of corruption, practices such as lending tend to be more frequent, which
reduces the quality of the loan portfolio of banks and increase concentration risk (La
Porta et al., 2003). In this regard, impartial institutional settings that remove policy
distortions favouring debt over equity financing and promote a greater diversification
of financing instruments, may strengthen regional resilience through increased financial
stability (Caldera-Sánchez and Gori, 2016). Supporting this line of argumentation,
Ahrend and Goujard (2012) show that larger debt bias in cross-border flows is associated
with a greater incidence of financial crises, while Sondermann (2016) finds that the
quality of government tends to reduce the frequency of crises. In a similar vein, the
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empirical evidence provided by Honing (2008) indicates that good governance outcomes
decrease the likelihood of sudden stop of capital inflows.
Moreover, the quality of government is likely to affect the level of systemic un-
certainty, which could have sizeable effects on the degree of vulnerability of regional
economies by determining the dynamic path of investment and employment rates (Ace-
moglu et al., 2003; Bloom, 2009). The intuition behind this argument is that the
institutional environment drives systemic uncertainty, and systemic uncertainty affects
economic performance and resilience. This mechanism operates through the so-called
depressive macroeconomic uncertainty effect, which usually leads to the “wait-and-see”
behaviour that is typical during periods of crisis, where investment rates fall, labour
demand and employment decrease and economic growth drops. Supportive evidence
on the link between low quality of government and uncertainty is provided by different
authors. For example, Calderón et al. (2016) find that in economies with low quality
of government the implementation of policy is pro-cyclical, which increases fluctuations
driving up overall uncertainty. Likewise, there are numerous studies showing the ex-
istence of a negative association between corruption and economic performance (e.g.
Mauro, 1995; Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; Aidt, 2009).
The quality of government can also affect the ability of regional economies to react
to recessionary shocks by increasing the dynamism of the private sector. Impartial leg-
islations and regulations that contribute to promoting private sector development can
strengthen antitrust enforcement, minimize barriers of entry and decrease privileges of
established firms (OECD, 2010). This favours the development of entrepreneurship,
which is particularly important to withstand and recover from recessionary shocks (Nis-
totskaya et al., 2015). Following Schumpeter (1942), Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998) show
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that periods of recession where creative destruction is likely to be at work can have a
potentially beneficial effect on growth paths if older technologies are replaced by newer
ones. Nevertheless, the creative-destruction process may not work if entry barriers are
high and if government regulations, instead of promoting a fair competition, favour cer-
tain agents. In this regard, Campos et al. (2010) find that corruption can represent
an important barrier for new firms, enhancing monopoly power and rents earned by in-
cumbent firms. This is consistent with the evidence provided by Sutherland and Hoeller
(2013), who show that stringent product market regulations reduces ex-post resilience
by increasing the persistence of economic downturns. In turn, Rodŕıguez-Pose and Di
Cataldo (2015) find that the quality of government affects innovative performance at the
regional level, which confirms the existence of a positive connection between governance
and regional competitiveness. In fact, as Putnam (2000, p. 325) argues, “institutional
factors are the key enablers of innovation, mutual learning and productivity growth”.
At the same time, the quality of government may be related to regional resilience
through its positive impact on the overall efficiency of the judicial system. The efficiency
of the judicial system affects the time and cost for resolving commercial disputes in a
local first-instance court, but also bankruptcy procedures. Efficient bankruptcy regula-
tions are crucial to allow for low-cost exit of less productive and insolvent firms, thus
improving resource reallocation (OECD, 2017). Hence, by strengthening market selec-
tion and resource reallocation, an impartial and efficient judicial system can increase
the capacity of regional economies to absorb recessionary shocks. Moreover, the quality
of government, minimizing the discrimination between lenders and borrowers in the res-
olution of bankruptcies, may also help to address the negative effects of non-performing
loans in periods of crisis by developing a suitable debt restructuring framework, thus
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providing incentives for banks to invest rather than freezing capital movements.
An alternative explanation of the potential link between quality of government and
regional resilience has to do with the impact of governance outcomes on the efficiency
of public investment (e.g. Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; Esfahani and Ramı́rez, 2003).
Regions with low quality of government are generally characterized by the presence
of persistent corruption, pervasive rent-seeking, self-serving decision-makers, and low
quality of bureaucracy. This set of problems often gives rise to imperfectly functioning
markets and institutional and government failure, which in turn reduces the capacity of
the public sector to design and implement effective policies that contribute to improving
the ability of regional economies to withstand and recover from recessionary shocks. In
fact, the evidence provided by Rodŕıguez-Pose and Garcilazo (2015) and Crescenzi et al.
(2016b) shows that the quality of government is an important factor when determining
the returns of public investment in the European regions.
A relatively low quality of government in any given region has a negative impact
on the business climate, which directly affects the probability of receiving foreign direct
investment (FDI). On the contrary, regions with better governance outcomes tend to
attract greater FDI (Fazio and Talamo, 2008; Rodŕıguez-Pose and Cols, 2017). A high
dependency of FDI increases the degree of exposure of regional economies to external
shocks, raising their vulnerability. Nevertheless, the final impact on regional resilience
is ambiguous because FDI can also help to improve economic performance in the host
region through the transfer of new technologies and know-how, and the creation of
linkages between foreign and domestic firms (OECD, 2017).
As can be seen, most of the different arguments laid down above point to the exis-
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tence of a positive relationship between quality of government and regional resilience.
However, despite its importance from a policy perspective, the potential link between
governance and regional resilience has not been empirically tested so far. In order to fill
this gap and complement the literature on the determinants of regional resilience, the
rest of the paper is devoted to investigating this issue in a cross-section of European
regions.
3 Measuring regional resilience and quality of gov-
ernment
Our study requires data on the degree of resilience of EU regions during the Great
Recession. Although the number of papers on regional resilience has significantly grown
in recent years, there is not an unanimous agreement about how to measure this concept
and different approaches have been applied in the literature (Martin and Sunley, 2015;
Doran and Fingleton, 2016). The majority of authors use univariate indices capturing
changes in the level of economic activity (e.g. Fingleton et al., 2012; Martin, 2012;
Crescenzi et al., 2016a), even though there are also studies based on the information
provided by composite indicators (e.g. Rizzi et al., 2018; Stańıčková and Melecký, 2018).
Against this background, and taking into account the nature of our study, we resort to
a widely used measure of regional resistance to recessionary shocks (Lagravinese, 2015;






where ∆Ei is the change in the employment rate in region i during the crisis period
2008-2013 (see Figure A1 in the online Appendix for further details). In turn, ∆EEU
stands for the average variation in the employment rate in the EU regions between 2008
and 2013. A positive value of this index means that region i exhibits greater resistance
to a recessionary shock than the EU average, while a negative value implies that region i
is less resistant than the EU average. RESi equals to zero when there is no difference in
the variation of the employment rate in region i and the EU average. As is usual in the
literature, this measure of regional resilience concentrates on the capacity of regional
labour markets to adapt to adverse shocks. We consider that this approach is more
informative in this context than focussing on output changes, as variations in employ-
ment better reflect the social impact of the Great Recession (Giannakis and Bruggeman,
2017). Although output is undoubtedly important from an economic perspective, the
employment rate is often more relevant for the welfare of ordinary citizens than the
creation of value added. This argument is particularly relevant nowadays in view of
the situation of many countries of the European periphery, where the recovery from the
Great Recession has often been jobless (Fratesi and Rodŕıguez-Pose, 2016).
We calculate the index of regional resilience just described for 255 NUTS2 regions
in the EU27,4 using data drawn from Eurostat for the crisis period 2008-2013.5 The
results are displayed in Figure 1. As can be observed, the impact of the Great Recession
has been far from homogeneous across the EU, and there are important geographical
4NUTS2 regions are used instead of other possible alternative for two reasons. First, NUTS2 is the
territorial unit most commonly used in the literature on regional resilience in the EU (e.g. Brakman
et al., 2015; Giannakis and Bruggeman, 2017; Rizzi et al., 2018), which facilitates the comparison of
our findings with those obtained in earlier studies. Second, NUTS2 regions are the basic unit for the
application of cohesion policies in the EU.
5The regional employment rates have been calculated as the ratio between the number of employed
persons and active population aged 15-64. These figures come from the EU Labour Force Survey (EU-
LFS), which follows the definitions and recommendations of the International Labour Organisation
(ILO).
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differences. The countries in the Southern periphery of Europe (i.e. Portugal, Spain,
Italy, Greece and Cyprus) have been particularly hard hit (Fingleton et al., 2014; Fratesi
and Rodŕıguez-Pose, 2016). Likewise, the labour markets of Ireland and Bulgaria have
shown relatively low levels of resistance to the economic downturn. On the contrary,
Germany, where employment continued to grow during the crisis, exhibits the best
performance. Austria, Belgium, Finland and Sweden also show relatively high values of
the resilience index. The observed differences between countries, however, do not hide
the existence of important within-country disparities (Groot et al., 2011; Capello et al.,
2015; Giannakis and Bruggeman, 2017). This is particularly evident in countries such
as France, Italy, the Netherlands, Romania or the United Kingdom.
INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE
In order to carry out our research, we also need information on the quality of govern-
ment in the EU regions. To that end, we resort to the European Quality of Government
Index (EQI), which has recently been constructed with the aim to provide scholars and
policy makers with a comparable and homogeneous measure of governance at the re-
gional level that can be used to make comparisons within and across countries in Europe
(Charron et al., 2014, 2015). The EQI is based on survey data about the perceptions
and experiences of European citizens on the quality, impartiality and level of corruption
in education, public health care and law enforcement. In order to obtain the EQI score
for the various regions, the information provided by the survey data is combined with
four of the six Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) developed by Kaufmann et al.
(1999): Voice and accountability, Government effectiveness, Rule of law, and Control of
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Corruption.6 So far, the EQI is available for three years: 2010, 2013 and 2017. Given
that we are interested in examining regional performances during the Great Recession,
we employ as our main independent variable the average values for years 2010 and
2013.7,8
Figure 2 provides a graphical illustration on the association between quality of gov-
ernment and regional resilience in the EU during the Great Recession.9 The scatter
plot suggests the existence of a positive relationship between governance outcomes and
regional resilience during the crisis. This means that regions with better quality of gov-
ernment tend to be more resilient, while those regions with worse governance outcomes
are characterized on average by a lower resistance to the Great Recession. Indeed, the
pairwise correlation between the two variables is statistically significant (ρ = 0.40 with
p-value = 0.000). Nevertheless, the information provided by Figure 2 should be treated
with caution, as the observed connection between quality of government and regional
resilience may simply be a spurious correlation resulting from the omission of other
variables affecting both governance and regional labour market performance. In view
of this potential problem, in the next section we develop a more appropriate statistical
analysis on the link between quality of government and regional resilience.
INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE
6See Charron et al. (2014, 2015) for further details on the methodology used to construct the EQI.
7The results of the analysis remain unaltered if the EQI values for 2010 are used.
8The EQI is available for all EU27 countries at NUTS2 regional level, with the exception of Belgium,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Sweden and the United Kingdom, for which the data are provided at
NUTS1 level. For these six countries we follow Rodŕıguez-Pose and Di Cataldo (2015) and Ketterer
and Rodŕıguez-Pose (2018), and assign the same EQI score to all NUTS2 regions nested within the
bigger NUTS1 regions.
9In order to facilitate the interpretation, the various variables used to construct the graphic were
normalized to make them range from 0 to 100. This transformation of the measures of regional resilience
and quality of government is also used in the regression analyses in the next section.
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4 Econometric approach
4.1 Model specification and estimation procedure
When considering the choice of an econometric specification to investigate the connection
between quality of government and regional resilience, it is important to note that
Figure 1 suggests that the capacity of resistance to the Great Recession is not randomly
distributed across space in the EU. On the contrary, there seems to be spatial clusters
of regions with similar levels of resilience to the crisis, while there are relatively few
cases in which a region shows a markedly different performance from its neighbours.
This is consistent with the evidence provided by Figure 3, which reveals the existence
of a positive and strong link between own resilience and the average of neighbouring
regions.10 In fact, the pairwise correlation between the two is 0.89 with p-value =
0.000. In order to confirm this spatial pattern, we calculate the Moran’s I test of spatial
autocorrelation. The result (I statistic is 0.766 with p-value = 0.00) leads to the rejection
of the null hypothesis of absence of spatial autocorrelation in the distribution of regional
resilience. This means that the regional distribution of high and/or low values of the
measure of resilience in equation (1) is more spatially clustered than would be expected
if the underlying spatial processes were random. The implications of this issue are
potentially important from an econometric perspective (Anselin, 1988). For this reason,
we consider the following cross-sectional model:
RES = αιn + λWRES + βQG + Xγ + u (2)
10The definition of neighbouring regions used here is based on physical contiguity. To ensure that
every region has at least one neighbour, we employ the Delaunay triangulation by constructing Voronoi




u = ρWu + ε (3)
where RES and QG are, respectively, n × 1 vectors consisting of one observation for
each region in the sample (i = 1, . . . , n) on the measures of regional resilience and
quality of government described in section 3. X is a n × k matrix of a set of variables
that control for different factors that are assumed to have an influence on regional
resilience. W is a n × n spatial weights matrix with non-negative elements indicating
how the regions in the sample are spatially interconnected. Its diagonal elements are
equal to zero by assumption, since no region can be viewed as its own neighbour. In
turn, u is a n × 1 disturbance vector, while ε is the corresponding n × 1 innovation
vector. Given the nature of our data, the innovations are assumed to be independent
but heteroskedastically distributed, where the heteroskedasticity is of unknown form.
Our main interest throughout the paper is in coefficient β, which captures the effect of
the quality of government on regional resilience.
INSERT FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE
This model is a fairly general specification that includes two different spatial pro-
cesses potentially relevant in our context. The first one, captured by the spatial lag of
the dependent variable (WRES), has to do with the possible presence of direct spatial
spillovers between neighbouring regions related to their capacity of resistance to reces-
sionary shocks, which would be consistent with the preliminary evidence provided by
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Figure 3. The second one, captured by the spatial autoregressive process in the distur-
bance term, additionally allows us to consider spatial spillovers between specific features
of the environment that may affect regional resilience. Given that neighbouring regions
tend to share many of these specific features, the inclusion of the spatial autoregressive
process in the model is necessary for consistent estimation of standard errors (Kelejian
et al., 2013). This spatial autoregressive model with autoregressive disturbances of order
(1, 1) is often known as a SARAR(1, 1) model (Anselin and Florax, 1995).
The inclusion of the spatial lag of the dependent variable in the list of regressors
in equation (2) implies that the OLS estimator will not be consistent (Anselin, 1988).
In view of this, we resort to the generalized spatial two stage least squares (GS2SLS)
estimator derived by Kelejian and Prucha (1998, 1999, 2010) and extended by Arraiz et
al. (2010) and Drucker et al. (2013), which implements a multistep estimation strategy
based on the generalized method of moments (GMM) and instrumental variables (IV)
to estimate the parameters of the model.11 This estimator provides consistent estimates
even when the innovations of the disturbance process in equation (3) are heteroskedasti-
cally distributed over the observations. This is especially relevant in our context, as the
sample regions are heterogeneous in important characteristics (e.g. size), which causes
one to suspect that the innovations of the disturbance process are hetorskedastic.12
11See Arraiz et al. (2010) or Drucker et al. (2013) for further technical details on the estimation
method.
12An additional concern when estimating the SARAR(1, 1) model in equations (2) and (3) has to
do with the possible endogeneity of the measure of quality of government. We address this potential
problem in section 5.2.
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4.2 Control variables
Our choice of control variables is mainly guided by the need to account for factors which
may affect both regional resilience and the quality of government and, consequently,
whose omission might bias the estimated effect of governance on regional resilience. On
the basis of a review of the recent literature on regional resilience, our SARAR(1, 1)
model incorporates various controls related to the sectoral composition of economic ac-
tivity and regional specialization, human capital and innovation activities, or the degree
of regional autonomy. We now describe these controls and provide a brief conceptual
justification for their inclusion in the analysis.13
The sectoral composition of economic activity and regional specialization
The sectoral composition is often considered as a key factor in explaining why regions
differ in their resilience to economic downturns such as the Great Recession (e.g. Davies,
2011, Brackman et al., 2015; Martin et al., 2016). Some economic activities are more
vulnerable to changes in the business cycle than others, and as such suffer the most
from recessionary shocks. This is the case of manufacturing and construction, which
traditionally are the most affected sectors during an economic crisis (Martin, 2012).
Conversely, other activities are more impervious to fluctuations in the business cycle.
For example, regions with higher levels of public employment are more protected from
downturns in the cycle, since they experience less job destruction during economic crises.
Likewise, the degree of protection and regulation of agricultural markets in the EU
implies that regions with relatively large agricultural sectors tend to be less exposed
13Table A1 in the online Appendix presents the detailed definitions and sources of all the control
variables used in the paper. Several descriptive statistics are included in Table A2.
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to changes in the business cycle (Rodŕıguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2007; Lagravinese, 2015;
Fratesi and Rodŕıguez-Pose, 2016). In view of this, we control for the shares of regional
employment in agriculture, manufacturing, and non-market services.14
In addition to the sectoral composition of economic activity, its degree of diversity
may also be relevant in this context (Martin et al., 2016). The neoclassical trade model
suggests that regions should specialize in those activities in which they enjoy a compara-
tive advantage over their trade partners. Indeed, the existence of external economies also
leads to specialization at the industry level. At the same time, a region with an exces-
sive reliance on a small number of activities is potentially more vulnerable and unstable
in case of a downturn, as it has much less scope to provide some measure of buffering
against the perturbation (Malizia and Ke, 1993; Trendle, 2006). On the contrary, a
diverse economic structure should allow a regional economy to “spread risk”, thus re-
ducing the intensity of cyclical fluctuations and increasing regional resilience (Baldwin
and Brown, 2003; Ezcurra, 2011).15 Accordingly, our baseline model also incorporates a
Herfindahl index to capture the degree of sectoral diversification in the sample regions.





where eis is the employment share of region i in sector s. The value of the Herfindahl
14In order to minimize any potential problem of reverse causality, all the time-varying controls de-
scribed in this section enter in the model as their respective means over the pre-crisis period 2000-2007.
The only exception is the indicator of regional autonomy, which refers to the period 2000-2005. This
strategy is consistent with the approach adopted in earlier studies on the determinants of regional
performance in Europe during the Great Recession (e.g. Groot et al., 2011; Crescenzi et al., 2016a;
Giannakis and Bruggeman, 2017).
15The type of industrial diversity may also be important in this context. In fact, Frenken et al.
(2007) claim that diversity in related industries (“related variety”) enhances knowledge spillovers and
has a positive effect on employment growth.
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index ranges from 1
S
when employment is evenly distributed across the S sectors, to 1
when all the employment is concentrated in the same sector. Therefore, the higher the
value of SPEi, the less sectorally diverse is the region in question.
The sectoral composition of economic activity may affect the institutional framework
(Nunn, 2007), which points to the possible existence of a connection between regional
specialization and the quality of government. This means that any observed association
between government quality and regional resilience may be spurious if industry mix and
the degree of sectoral diversification are ignored.
Human capital and innovation
Among the determinants of regional competitiveness, the endowment of human capital
and innovation activities play a key role in explaining the ability of a region to react to a
recessionary shock (Chapple and Lester, 2010; Di Caro, 2017). This has to do with the
close connection between both factors and the capacity of regional economies to absorb
externally generated new ideas and create new knowledge (Crescenzi, 2009; Crescenzi
and Rodŕıguez-Pose, 2011). Although this is important in all phases of the economic
cycle, its relevance increases during a crisis. For example, as pointed out by Crescenzi
et al. (2016a), an innovation-prone regional environment can contribute to alleviating
the negative consequences of the crisis not only by developing new products and/or
new technologies, but also by fostering organizational innovation and the reduction of
production costs to maintain regional competitiveness. Furthermore, regions with high
levels of human capital and innovation activities are in better position to attract the most
sophisticated and high-value-added functions of multinational firms, thus increasing
17
the regional resistance to adverse economic disturbances (Crescenzi et al., 2014). For
this reason, we include in the list of regressors in equation (2) the population share
with tertiary education and the number of patents per inhabitant, as proxies for the
endowment of human capital and the intensity of innovation activities in the sample
regions.16 At this point it is important to note that these variables may also be correlated
with the quality of government at the regional level (Rodŕıguez-Pose and Di Cataldo,
2015). Consequently, their inclusion in our baseline model is especially necessary in
order to estimate the impact of governance on regional resilience independently of the
effect of these covariates.
Regional autonomy
The degree of fiscal and political decentralization may also be related to regional re-
silience. In fact, the transfer of resources and powers from central to subnational gov-
ernments is often justified as a means to improve economic performance, both at the
local and at the aggregate level, pushing the traditional arguments of safeguarding local
identity or culture into the background (Rodŕıguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008). This sup-
posed economic dividend is based on the so-called “decentralization theorem”, which
states that subnational tiers of government are more capable than central governments
to tailor the provision of public goods and services to the needs of citizens due to the
existence of informational advantages and a better insight into the preferences of the
local population (Tibebout, 1956; Oates, 1972). This implies that, in the absence of
interjurisdictional spillover effects and large scale economies, decentralization can lead
16The main results of the paper hold whether we use R&D expenditure instead of the number of
patents to capture the degree of innovation capacity.
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to efficiency gains in the allocation of resources at the local level (Ezcurra, 2017). More-
over, decentralization should allow subnational governments to adopt specific policies in
order to mitigate the effects on the local economy of adverse shocks.
Nevertheless, the literature also warns about the potential risks of decentralization
for economic performance. Thus, the needs and preferences for public goods and ser-
vices may not differ significantly across regions within a country, which casts doubts
on the validity of the decentralization theorem. At the same time, capacity constraints
may limit the ability of subnational governments to make the most from devolution.
Furthermore, poorer regions often must face an additional disadvantage in the provision
of public goods and services due to the lack of suitable human resources to develop an
efficient administration (Treisman, 2007). Additionally, subnational governments may
be more vulnerable to capture by local interests, generating greater corruption, clien-
telism and nepotism (Rodŕıguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2011). This latter point is especially
relevant in our context, as it suggests the possible existence of a connection between
decentralization and quality of government (Fisman and Gatti, 2002; Enikolopov and
Zhuravskaya, 2007). This raises the possibility that the measure of governance used in
our analysis is really capturing the effect on regional resilience of decentralization. In
order to test whether this is the case, we should control for the degree of decentraliza-
tion in the sample regions. To do this, we resort to an indicator of regional economic
self-rule proposed by Sorens (2014), which captures the degree of authority exercised by
a regional government over those who live in its territory. The indicator is constructed
using data drawn from the Regional Authority Index (RAI) developed by Hooghe et al.
(2010), and combines information on the degree of fiscal and political decentralization
in the sample regions (see Table A1 in the online Appendix for further details). Bearing
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in mind the previous discussion, we consider the possible presence of a non-linear link
between decentralization and regional resilience. To that end, we include in the list of
regressors the indicator of regional self-rule and its square.
Other factors
In addition to the different factors discussed above, agglomeration economies and the de-
mographic structure may have influence on regional resilience. Agglomeration economies
arise when people and firms locate near one another together in cities and industrial
clusters, which ultimately implies transport costs savings (Glaeser, 2010). The impact
of agglomeration economies in regional resilience is not clear beforehand. On the one
hand, highly urbanized areas may increase the probability of matching job seekers and
firms, improving the functioning of regional labour markets in an economic downturn.
However, negative effects and agglomeration diseconomies may arise if the time spent by
workers to collect information about the vacancies on the job market rises or if problems
of crowding and congestion increase excessively (Fujita and Thisse, 2002; Rios, 2017).
Taking this into account, employment density is used in our analysis as a proxy for the
relevance of agglomeration economies in any given region.
Regional resilience may also be related to the demographic structure, which is di-
rectly related to the availability of adequate labour supply for the different economic
activities and to the degree of social vulnerability (Groenewold, 1997; Bigos et al., 2013).
The expected effects of the demographic structure on regional resilience are theoreti-
cally ambiguous. Thus, regions with older populations are at higher technological risk
than regions with younger populations due to the skill obsolescence effect (Dixon, 2003).
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Moreover, older populations are likely to be less flexible and mobile than younger ones,
which should amplify the skill miss-match between labour demand and supply along the
geographical dimension, thus increasing regional labour market vulnerability. In addi-
tion, the empirical evidence shows that older populations are less prone to innovation
(Aksoy et al., 2015) and less productive (Lovasz and Rigo, 2013), which should have a
negative effect on the ability to develop new growth paths once a region has been hit
by a recessionary shock. This suggests that older populations may have lower levels of
resilience than younger ones. However, there are also arguments that indicate that the
opposite may also be true. If different cohorts have different levels of productivity, it
is likely that age structure may affect economic development paths. At this point, the
literature stresses that a worker’s productivity systematically varies over her working life
for reasons such as the accumulation of experience over time, depreciation of knowledge,
and age-related trends in physical and mental capabilities (Aiyar et al., 2016). In this
regard, a more mature labour force may have higher average levels of work experience,
with potentially positive effects on productivity (Disney, 1996; Burtless, 2013). More-
over, a large young cohort relative to the parental cohort results in higher competition
for jobs, lower opportunities for promotion, and higher tightness of the labour market
(Easterlin, 1978). In fact, younger populations might be trapped in the lower end of the
labour market with less on-the-job training, lower wages and worse career prospects,
experiencing long spells of joblessness and high risk of exclusion and vulnerability to
shocks. In order to control for the role of age structure, we include in our econometric




Figure 1 shows that regional resilience in the EU is clearly affected by national patterns
(Crescenzi et al., 2016a; Giannakis and Bruggeman, 2017). In view of this, our baseline
specification also incorporates country dummies to ensure that the observed link between
quality of government and regional resilience is not simply capturing the latent influence
of institutional, economic and/or historical factors at the national level. Accordingly,
our analysis focuses on the ability of the quality of government to explain variations in
regional resilience within the EU countries.
4.3 The spatial weights matrix
The estimation of the SARAR(1, 1) model described above requires to define previously a
spatial weights matrix. Given that this is a critical issue in spatial econometric modelling
(Corrado and Fingleton, 2012), we consider a broad range of alternative specifications
of W. Thus, we begin by constructing a spatial weights matrix based on the concept
of first order contiguity, according to which wij = 1 if regions i and j are physically
adjacent and 0 otherwise. We also consider several matrices based on the k-nearest
neighbours (k = 5, 10, 15, 20, 25), computed from the great circle distance between the
centroids of the various regions (Le Gallo and Ertur, 2003). Additionally, we construct
various exponential decay and inverse distance matrices whose off-diagonal elements are
defined respectively by wij = exp(−θdij) for θ = 0.01, 0.05, and wij = 1dαij for α = 2
with cut-offs at the first, second and third quartile of the geographical distance between
regions. As an alternative, we also consider inverse linear distance weights matrices with
cuff-offs at 750, 1,000 and 1,500 kilometres. As can be observed, the different matrices
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described above are based in all cases on the geographical distance between the sample
regions, which in itself is strictly exogenous. Furthermore, as is common practice in
applied research, all the matrices are row-standardized, so that it is relative, and not
absolute, distance which matters.
In the literature there are different criteria to determine the spatial weights matrix
that best describes the data. One of the most widely used approach is to compare the
log-likelihood function values. Nevertheless, this approach has been criticized because
it only finds a local maximum among competing models and it may be the case that
the correctly specified W is not included (Vega and Elhorst, 2014). As an alternative
criterion, Elhorst et al. (2013) suggest to select the model with the lowest parameter
estimate of the residual variance. Table 1 shows that, according to these criteria, the
most appropriate matrix in our context is that based on the 15-nearest neighbours.
Therefore, this is the spatial weights matrix used in the rest of the paper.
INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE
5 Empirical findings
5.1 Main results
Table 2 presents the results obtained when different versions of the SARAR(1, 1) model
in equations (2) and (3) are estimated by GS2SLS for the case of heteroskedastic inno-
vations of unknown form in the disturbance process. The estimated coefficient of the
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spatial lag of the dependent variable is in all cases positive and statistically significant
at the 1% level, indicating the existence of strong spatial dependence in regional re-
silience. In other words, the capacity of resistance to the Great Recession for a given
region is positively affected by resilience in neighbouring regions. This is in line with the
information provided by Figure 3, and highlights the need to take into account spatial
effects when modelling regional resilience in the EU. Focussing on the major aim of the
paper, the main finding is that the coefficient of the measure of quality of government is
in all cases positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This means that higher
quality of government is associated with greater regional resilience, which is consistent
with most of the arguments laid down in section 2 and the preliminary evidence dis-
played in Figure 2. In fact, this result is not affected by the inclusion in the analysis
of the different controls described in section 4.2, confirming its robustness and showing
that the observed connection between quality of government and regional resilience is
not simply a spurious correlation resulting from the omission of these covariates. In
fact, the magnitude of the coefficient of the measure of quality of government tends to
be relatively stable in the various specifications of the SARAR(1, 1) model considered
in Table 2, which increases our confidence in suggesting that the relationship between
governance and regional resilience is not driven by an omitted variable.
INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE
In any case, the information provide by Table 2 should be treated with caution
because the presence of the spatial lag of the dependent variable in the list of regressors
complicates the interpretation of the coefficient estimates. As shown by LeSage and Pace
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(2009, pp. 33-42), in this type of spatial model a change in a particular explanatory
variable in region i has a direct effect on the dependent variable in that region, but also
an indirect effect on the remaining regions. In our context, the direct effect reflects the
average change in the measure of resistance to the crisis in a particular region caused
by a one unit change in that region’s explanatory variable. In turn, the indirect effect
can be defined as the aggregate impact on resilience in a specific region caused by the
change in an explanatory variable in all other regions or, alternatively, as the impact of
changing an explanatory variable in a particular region on resilience in the remaining
regions.17 Finally, the total effect is the sum of the direct and indirect effects.
Table 3 shows the direct, indirect and total effects calculated from the SARAR(1,
1) model with the full set of controls (column 6 of Table 2).18 The results confirm the
existence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between quality of gov-
ernment and regional resilience, thus reinforcing our previous findings. In particular, our
estimate of the total effect reveals that increasing the measure of quality of government
by one standard deviation is associated with an increase in the indicator of resilience of
around 4.7 points, which is, for example, the difference between Franche-Comté (FR43)
and Åland (FI2). As can be observed in Table 3, most of this total effect is due to the
direct effect of governance on regional resilience. However, the indirect effect is also
positive and statistically significant. This implies that the ability of resistance to the
crisis of a particular region depends partly on the quality of government in neighbour-
ing regions, which highlights again the empirical relevance of spatial spillovers in this
context.
17LeSage and Pace (2009) show that the numerical magnitudes of these two calculations are identical
due to symmetries in computation.
18See LeSage and Pace (2009, pp. 36-37) for further details on the calculation of these effects.
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INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE
With respect to the various control variables included in our baseline model, Table
3 shows that the employment share in agriculture is positively associated with regional
resilience. This seems to indicate that regions with a relatively important presence of
farming activities are more resilient, which may be related to the high degree of pro-
tection that characterizes agricultural markets in the EU (Rodŕıguez-Pose and Fratesi,
2007). At the same time, the endowment of human capital appears as an important fac-
tor in explaining the ability of regional labour markets to react to recessionary shocks.
This result is consistent with previous findings on the determinants of regional resilience
(e.g. Di Caro, 2017; Giannakis and Bruggeman, 2017), and confirms that human cap-
ital is key in providing a generally innovation-prone environment that allows regional
economies to identify creative solutions to external disturbances (Crescenzi et al., 2016a).
Interestingly, spatial spillovers also affect the connection between human capital and re-
gional resilience. In fact, our estimates reveal that the reaction to the Great Recession of
a particular region is positively influenced by the endowment of human capital in neigh-
bouring regions. Furthermore, the information provided by Table 3 shows the existence
of a U-shaped relationship between regional autonomy and resilience. This implies that
the transfer of resources and power from central to subnational governments initially
exerts a negative impact on regional resilience. However, beyond a certain level, the
relationship becomes positive, indicating that the degree of self-rule increases regional
resilience. According to our estimates, the turning point is situated slightly below the
level of autonomy experienced by Austrian regions. The remaining covariates are not
statistically significant at conventional levels.
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5.2 Robustness checks
The analysis performed so far reveals the existence of a positive association between
quality of government and regional resilience. In this section we investigate the robust-
ness of this finding.
Endogeneity of government quality
A potential concern with our previous results has to do with the possible endogeneity
of governance in this context. Regional resilience may by determined by the quality
of government, but the quality of government may, in turn, be influenced by regional
economic performance, giving rise to a reverse causality problem. Moreover, the in-
dicator of quality of government used in the paper may be affected by measurement
errors. Finally, although our baseline specification includes a substantial set of con-
trols and country dummies, we cannot definitely rule out the possible existence of an
omitted determinant of regional resilience correlated with government performance. In
view of these potential problems, we now treat the measure of quality of government as
endogenous. Nevertheless, a literature review shows that it is really difficult to identify
variables that affect governance and not regional labour market performance. Faced
with this problem, we follow the strategy adopted by Kelejian et al. (2013) and use as
instruments the linearly independent columns of (X, WX, W2X).19 Table 4 presents
the effects on regional resilience of the different variables included in our baseline model
when we use the set of instruments just described in order to address the potential
19It is standard practice in the literature to use this type of instruments to estimate models similar
to ours. See Kelejian and Prucha (1998), Das et al. (2003) or Arraiz et al. (2010) for further details.
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endogeneity of the quality of government.20 As can be seen, the different effects of the
quality of government on regional resilience continue to be positive and statistically sig-
nificant in all cases, in line with our previous findings. This suggests that the results in
Tables 2 and 3 are not driven by the potential endogeneity of the measure of quality of
government.
INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE
Alternative estimation strategies and spatial models
We now examine whether the results in section 5.1 are robust to the employment of
an alternative method to estimate the SARAR(1, 1) model in equations (2) and (3).
With this purpose, we repeat the previous analysis using a quasi-maximum likelihood
(QML) estimator in lieu of the GS2SLS estimator used so far. Table 5 shows that
the observed relationship between quality of government and regional resilience remains
unaltered when we use this alternative estimation strategy. That said, it is important
to recall that these estimates should be treated with caution, since if the innovations
in the disturbance process in equation (3) are hetoroskedastic, the QML estimator can
produce inconsistent results (Kelejian and Prucha, 2010). In any case, the magnitude
of the impact of the quality of government on regional resilience is very similar to that
obtained when the GS2SLS estimator is used (Table 3).
INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE
20The different effects calculated in this section are derived from the estimates in column (6) of Tables
A3-A9 in the online Appendix.
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We also explore to what extent our results depend on the specific spatial model
used to investigate the link between quality of government and regional resilience. As
discussed in section 4.1, in our particular context there are various reasons to justify
the employment of a first-order SARAR model as our baseline specification. However,
in view that the results in Table 2 reveal that the spatial autocorrelation coefficient is
not statistically significant, we now proceed to estimate a spatial autoregressive model.
Furthermore, as an additional robustness check, we also consider the possibility that
regional resilience may be directly affected by conditions in neighbouring regions rather
than indirectly by the effect of these conditions on the resilience of neighbouring regions.
In order to examine this issue, we add spatial lags of the various explanatory variables as
additional regressors in equation (2), which leads to the so-called spatial Durbin model.
The results in Table 6 reveal that our main findings still hold, regardless of the spatial
model considered. In all cases there is a positive and statistically significant association
between quality of government and the ability of regional labour markets to react to
the crisis. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that in the spatial Durbin model, the
indirect effect of governance on regional resilience is statistically significant only at the
10% level (see also Table A6 in the online Appendix for further details). This seems to
suggest that the spatial spillovers induced by the quality of government mainly operate
in an indirect way through the impact of governance on the resilience of neighbouring
regions, which supports the employment of a SARAR model in this context.
INSERT TABLE 6 AROUND HERE
29
Alternative dimensions of the quality of government
As stated in section 3, our measure of the quality of government, the EQI, is based
on different surveys whose questions are centred on three concepts related to different
aspects of governance: the quality, impartiality and level of corruption in education,
public health care and law enforcement. Nevertheless, although they are positively
correlated, it is not clear a priori that these three dimensions of governance affect regional
resilience in the same way. For this reason, and in order to complement our previous
analysis, we now resort to the information provided by the EQI to examine separately
the role played in this context by the quality, impartiality and degree of corruption in
the public services mentioned above. The results displayed in Table 7 show that these
three aspects of the quality of government exert a positive and statistically significant
effect on regional resilience, in line with our previous findings.21 In fact, according to
our estimates, the quantitative impact is very similar in all cases, which indicates that
the observed connection between governance and regional resilience is not driven by a
particular dimension of the quality of government.
INSERT TABLE 7 AROUND HERE
21This finding still holds when we treat the various dimensions of quality of government as endogenous
using the instruments described above. See Tables A10-A13 in the online Appendix for further details.
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6 Conclusions
This paper has examined the relationship between quality of government and regional
resilience in the EU during the Great Recession. The results show that the quality of
government is an important factor when shaping the regional reactions to the crisis in the
EU. Our estimates reveal that higher quality of government is associated with greater
regional resilience during the Great Recession. This is partly due to the role played in
this context by spatial spillovers induced by the quality of government in neighbouring
regions. The observed connection between governance and regional resilience is robust
to the inclusion in the analysis of different explanatory variables that may affect both
government quality and regional resilience. Likewise, our findings do not depend on the
specific dimension of governance considered, the estimation method or the econometric
specification employed to capture the nature of spatial spillovers.
The results of the paper raise potentially important policy implications, especially
at a time in which there is an active public debate about what are the most appropriate
instruments to reduce the impact of recessionary shocks on regional economies. Our
analysis suggests that improving the quality of government may contribute to increasing
the ability of regions to react to economic downturns. Accordingly, when designing
effective development strategies, policy makers should pay particular attention to the
way in which authority is exercised by regional governments. However, improving the
quality of government at the regional level may not be an easy task in the European
setting. Thus, it is likely that public intervention in this context cannot be based on a
“one size fits all” policy framework. Moreover, it is important to recall that the quality
of government depends in turn on historical and cultural factors, which cannot be easily
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modified in the short run.
Additional extensions to our work are not difficult to conceive. For example, it would
be interesting to extend the study period to the post-crisis years. Lack of regional data
has prevented us from pursuing this issue, but addressing it may provide a more com-
plete perspective about the nature of the relationship between governance and regional
resilience. Further research will also have to pay special attention to the need to iden-
tify and study the various transmission channels which explain ultimately the effect of
governance on regional economic performance. Only by addressing these issues, we will
be able to have a more detailed understanding about the way in which the quality of
government affects regional resilience.
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La Porta, R., López-de-Silanes, F., & Zamarripa, G. (2003). Related lending. Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 231-267.
Lagravinese, R. (2015). Economic crisis and rising gaps North-South: Evidence from
the Italian regions. Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 8(2),
331-342.
40
Le Gallo, J., & Ertur, C. (2003). Exploratory spatial data analysis of the distribution
of regional per capita GDP in Europe, 19801995. Papers in Regional Science,
82(2), 175-201.
LeSage, J., & Pace, R. K. (2009). An Introduction to Spatial Econometrics. Chapman
and Hall, Boca Raton (FL).
Lovasz, A., & Rigo, M. (2013). Vintage effects, ageing and productivity. Labour
Economics, 22, 47-60.
Malizia E. E., & Ke, S. (1993). The influence of economic diversity on employment
and stability. Journal of Regional Science, 33(2), 221-235.
Martin, R. (2012). Regional economic resilience, hysteresis and recessionary shocks.
Journal of Economic Geography, 12(1), 1-32.
Martin, R., & Sunley, P. (2015). On the notion of regional economic resilience: Con-
ceptualization and explanation. Journal of Economic Geography, 15(1), 1-42.
Martin, R., Sunley, P., Gardiner, B., & Tyler, P. (2016). How regions react to re-
cessions: Resilience and the role of economic structure. Regional Studies, 50(4),
561-585.
Nistotskaya, M., Charron, N., & Lapuente, V. (2015). The wealth of regions: Quality
of government and SMEs in 172 European regions. Environment and Planning C:
Government and Policy, 33(5), 1125-1155.
Nunn, N. (2007). Relationship-specificity, incomplete contracts, and the pattern of
trade. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(2), 569-600.
41
Oates, W. (1972). Fiscal Federalism. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York.
OECD (2010). Moving Beyond the Job Crisis. Employment Outlook. OECD, Paris.
OECD (2017).OECD G20 Policy Paper on Economic Resilience and Structural Poli-
cies. OECD, Paris.
Oates, W. (1972). Fiscal Federalism. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York.
Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Com-
munity. Simon & Schuster, New York.
Rios, V. (2017). What drives unemployment disparities in European regions? A
dynamic spatial panel approach. Regional Studies, 51(11), 1599-1611.
Rizzi, P., Graziano, P., & Dallara, A. (2018). A capacity approach to territorial
resilience: the case of European regions. The Annals of Regional Science, 60(2),
285-328.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Regional resilience in the EU during the Great Recession (2008-2013).
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat data.
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Table 1: Spatial weights matrix selection.
Log-likelihood Residual
function value variance
First order contiguity -687.973 29.590
5-nearest neighbours -683.698 28.593
10-nearest neighbours -683.688 28.593
15-nearest neighbours -679.254 27.184
20-nearest neighbours -680.946 27.542
25-nearest neighbours -681.140 27.520
exp− (θd), θ = 0.01 -689.139 29.497
exp− (θd), θ = 0.01, cut-off at Q1 -689.145 29.491
exp− (θd), θ = 0.01, cut-off at Q2 -689.123 29.528
exp− (θd), θ = 0.05 -688.617 29.315
exp− (θd), θ = 0.05, cut-off at Q1 -688.645 29.313
exp− (θd), θ = 0.05, cut-off at Q2 -688.624 29.320
1/dα, α = 2.00 -688.883 29.869
1/dα, α = 2.00, cut-off at Q1 -686.949 29.315
1/dα, α = 2.00, cut-off at Q2 -685.957 29.043
1/dα, α = 1.00, cut-off at 750 km -685.513 28.961
1/dα, α = 1.00, cut-off at 1000 km -682.945 28.355
1/dα, α = 1.00, cut-off at 1500 km -691.549 27.306
Notes: Bayesian Markov Monte Carlo Chain (MCMC) routines devel-
oped by James LeSage are employed to carry out the estimation of the
SARAR(1, 1) model in equations (2) and (3) with the different spatial
weights matrices considered. The full set of controls described in section
4.2 is included in all the estimations. Log-likelihood values reported in
column (1) are obtained evaluating the likelihood of the SARAR(1, 1)
model at the posterior mean of the estimated parameter vector after
5,000 MCMC draws.
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Table 2: Quality of government and regional resilience: Baseline results.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Neighbours’ resilience 0.341*** 0.393*** 0.378*** 0.330*** 0.357*** 0.407***
(0.082) (0.078) (0.078) (0.081) (0.080) (0.075)
Quality of government 0.162*** 0.159*** 0.184*** 0.149*** 0.173*** 0.144***





Non-market services -0.086 -0.077
(0.143) (0.162)
Regional specialization 0.207 0.127
(0.274) (0.273)




Regional autonomy -1.008*** -0.993***
(0.206) (0.199)
Regional autonomy squared 0.023*** 0.022***
(0.005) (0.005)
Employment density 0.153 -0.807
(0.565) (0.605)
Young population -0.524 -0.418
(0.358) (0.313)
Old population 0.558* 0.131
(0.303) (0.275)
Spatial autoregressive -0.192 -0.062 -0.418 -0.417 -0.334 -0.489
coefficient (0.284) (0.313) (0.320) (0.283) (0.286) (0.330)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.924 0.927 0.927 0.928 0.928 0.935
Observations 255 255 255 255 255 255
Notes: The estimation method is GS2SLS with heteroskedastic innovations of unknown form in the
disturbance process. The dependent variable is in all cases the index of regional resilience described in
section 3. Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include a constant (not shown). * Significant
at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
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Table 3: Baseline results: Direct, indirect and total effects.
Direct Indirect Total
effects effects effects
Quality of government 0.146*** 0.097** 0.243***
(0.056) (0.041) (0.090)
Agriculture 0.174* 0.115 0.289*
(0.093) (0.073) (0.161)
Manufacturing -0.101 -0.067 -0.168
(0.117) (0.083) (0.198)
Non-market services -0.078 -0.052 -0.131
(0.164) (0.112) (0.276)
Regional specialization 0.129 0.086 0.215
(0.276) (0.186) (0.461)
Human capital 0.255** 0.169* 0.424**
(0.113) (0.093) (0.198)
Innovation -0.494 -0.328 -0.822
(0.645) (0.449) (1.087)
Regional autonomy -1.006*** -0.669 -1.675***
(0.202) (0.255) (0.411)
Regional autonomy squared 0.022*** 0.015 0.037***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.010)
Employment density -0.818 -0.543 -1.361
(0.613) (0.459) (1.055)
Young population -0.424 -0.282 -0.705
(0.317) (0.223) (0.530)
Old population 0.133 0.088 0.222
(0.279) (0.186) (0.464)
Notes: The different effects are calculated from the estimates in
column (6) of Table 2. The dependent variable is in all cases the
index of regional resilience described in section 3. * Significant at
10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
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Table 4: Robustness analysis: Endogeneity of the quality of government.
Direct Indirect Total
effects effects effects
Quality of government 0.162** 0.104** 0.266**
(0.069) (0.047) (0.109)
Agriculture 0.168* 0.107 0.275*
(0.091) (0.069) (0.155)
Manufacturing -0.097 -0.062 -0.159
(0.119) (0.081) (0.198)
Non-market services -0.070 -0.045 -0.115
(0.168) (0.110) (0.278)
Regional specialization 0.128 0.082 0.210
(0.274) (0.178) (0.452)
Human capital 0.257** 0.164* 0.421**
(0.114) (0.090) (0.195)
Innovation -0.518 -0.331 -0.848
(0.650) (0.436) (1.080)
Regional autonomy -1.008*** -0.644*** -1.652***
(0.203) (0.248) (0.406)
Regional autonomy squared 0.022*** 0.014** 0.037***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.010)
Employment density -0.768 -0.491 -1.258
(0.632) (0.452) (1.069)
Young population -0.399 -0.255 -0.654
(0.320) (0.216) (0.528)
Old population 0.164 0.105 0.269
(0.289) (0.185) (0.472)
Notes: The different effects are calculated from the estimates in
column (6) of Table A3. The dependent variable is in all cases the
index of regional resilience described in section 3. * Significant at
10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
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Table 5: Robustness analysis: Alternative estimation method. QML estimates.
Direct Indirect Total
effects effects effects
Quality of government 0.169*** 0.088*** 0.257***
(0.055) (0.034) (0.081)
Agriculture 0.143* 0.075 0.217*
(0.080) (0.051) (0.128)
Manufacturing -0.103 -0.054 -0.157
(0.090) (0.050) (0.139)
Non-market services -0.055 -0.029 -0.084
(0.126) (0.066) (0.192)
Regional specialization 0.083 0.043 0.126
(0.238) (0.123) (0.361)
Human capital 0.252** 0.131* 0.383**
(0.099) (0.069) (0.160)
Innovation -0.542 -0.283 -0.825
(0.667) (0.371) (1.031)
Regional autonomy -1.087*** -0.567** -1.654***
(0.291) (0.231) (0.479)
Regional autonomy squared 0.024*** 0.013** 0.037***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.011)
Employment density -0.649 -0.339 -0.987
(0.663) (0.364) (1.017)
Young population -0.434 -0.227 -0.661
(0.310) (0.178) (0.480)
Old population 0.148 0.077 0.225
(0.307) (0.162) (0.468)
Notes: The different effects are calculated from the estimates in
column (6) of Table A4. The dependent variable is in all cases the
index of regional resilience described in section 3. * Significant at
10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
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Table 6: Robustness analysis: Alternative spatial models.
Spatial autoregressive model Spatial Durbin model
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
effects effects effects effects effects effects
Quality of government 0.133** 0.092** 0.225** 0.175*** 0.930* 1.105**
(0.056) (0.043) (0.093) (0.057) (0.542) (0.549)
Agriculture 0.198** 0.137* 0.335* 0.163* -0.264 -0.102
(0.096) (0.083) (0.172) (0.088) (0.661) (0.684)
Manufacturing -0.098 -0.068 -0.166 -0.138 0.385 0.247
(0.124) (0.092) (0.214) (0.117) (0.684) (0.706)
Non-market services -0.107 -0.074 -0.182 -0.074 2.184 2.110
(0.174) (0.126) (0.300) (0.141) (1.969) (1.970)
Regional specialization 0.213 0.147 0.360 -0.090 -6.505 -6.595
(0.298) (0.212) (0.507) (0.270) (5.875) (5.937)
Human capital 0.248** 0.172* 0.420*** 0.166 -1.362 -1.196
(0.117) (0.101) (0.209) (0.126) (1.344) (1.423)
Innovation -0.356 -0.247 -0.603 -0.060 -5.197 -5.257
(0.665) (0.475) (1.136) (0.750) (4.308) (4.542)
Regional autonomy -0.903*** -0.624** -1.527*** -1.270*** -8.679 -9.948
(0.209) (0.265) (0.434) 0.295 (5.878) (6.078)
Regional autonomy squared 0.020*** 0.014** 0.034*** 0.029*** 0.246 0.274
(0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.165) (0.170)
Employment density -0.996 -0.689 -1.686 0.116 22.904 23.020
(0.629) (0.512) (1.114) (0.743) (16.143) (16.611)
Young population -0.390 -0.270 -0.660 -0.056 -0.561 -0.617
(0.325) (0.236) (0.552) (0.302) (1.872) (1.996)
Old population 0.098 0.068 0.165 0.278 4.068 4.347
(0.278) (0.192) (0.469) (0.306) (3.056) (3.160)
Notes: The different effects are calculated from the estimates in column (6) of Tables A5 and A6. The
dependent variable is in all cases the index of regional resilience described in section 3. * Significant at
10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
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